



We are all connected - Interconnection Attacks

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One Highlight from WP4

Roaming Network – Interconnection Network

Not the Internet – but equally important



We are all connected to the Interconnection Network



History

- Established more than 35 years ago between a few state owned operators
- Build on trust (closed private network)
- No inbuilt security (in particular, no source authentication)
- SS7 protocol was constantly extended for new services and features
- New service providers connect all the time e.g. IPX roaming hubs, Application to user SMS, etc
- Now moving towards LTE / Diameter based protocols (4G/5G)



Closed & Private Network?



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- > Why Three?
- > About Three
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Wholesale Interconnect (Three Ireland (Hutchison) Limited).

Below you can see what I can provide. Contact information at the bottom page.

SERVICES

CELL PHONE REPORTS

A cell phone report contains network information, such as MCC, MNC, IMSI, TMSI and location information (real time) - You can request more, like the encryption keys of the current session.

3 LOOKUPS: \$150

CELL PHONE INTERCEPTION

This service is simple and easy, I only require you to provide the target MSISDN (number), along with a destination number that I can redirect the incoming/outcoming requests to.

CALLS: \$100

SMS MESSAGES: \$200

SPOOFED SMS MESSAGING/CALLING

You will be provided with a web panel and an access code, then you can send SMS messages and make calls without any restrictions, just by clicking a button.

1 MONTH: \$20

SS7 API

With this, you can do everything I can, just by logging into an SSH server I have open. API Access includes the following: Tracking, subscription modifying, jamming, intercepting, SMS/Call spoofing.

1 MONTH: \$200

3 MONTHS: \$500

12 MONTH: \$1200



221.177.247.252

China Mobile

Added on 2016-09-22 15:34:36 GMT

China

Details

ZXR10 xGW-16, ZTE ZXR10 Software Version: ZXUN xGW(GGSN)V4.10.13(1.0.0)


The Intercept

OPERATION SOCIALIST

The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium's Largest Telco



One of the prime targets monitored under the AURORAGOLD program is the London-headquartered trade group, the GSM Association, or the GSMA, which represents the interests of more than 800 major cellphone, software, and internet companies from 220 countries.




MIDDLE EAST 21:21 24.09.2016 (updated 22:22 24.09.2016) [Get short URL](#) 1 476 0 0

Kovacs on May 04, 2017

Existing Attacks for the "old" SS7

If no protection is deployed

- Location Tracking
- Eavesdropping
- Fraud
- Denial of Service user & network
- Credential theft
- Data session hijacking
- Unblocking stolen phone
- SMS interception
- One time password theft and account takeover for banks, Telegram, Facebook, Whatsapp, g-mail (bitcoin)



JUN 15, 2016 @ 08:00 AM 71,405 VIEWS

Hackers Can Steal Your Facebook Account With Just A Phone Number



Thomas Fox-Brewster, PC
I cover crime, privacy and security




WIRELESS



Telenor mobile network hit by international signal

Monday 22 February 2016 | 16:03 CET | News



Security

Someone checked and, yup, you can still hijack Gmail, Bitcoin wallets etc via dirty SS7 tricks

Two-factor authentication by SMS? More like SOS

By John Leyden 18 Sep 2017 at 23:37

16 SHARE



hers has been shaken



**All will be better with LTE and
Diameter.....**

All will be ~~better~~ **different** with
LTE and Diameter.....

Diameter Attacks researched under the CyberTrust Project

- Location Tracking (NATO CyCon Conference, 2015)
- Downgrading attacks (Troopers TelcoSec 2016)
- Denial of Service & Fraud (Blackhat, 2016)
- SMS and one time password interception (IEEE ICC 2017) (e.g. g-mail, MS, Twitter, Facebook, Amazon, etc)
- Subscriber Profile Modification (Network and System Security 2017)

To come

- Data interception for GPRS & LTE (potentially December 2017)

Countermeasures for operators

Detect

Monitor network traffic
Penetration & re-testing
Tenant monitoring

Mitigate

Filter, filter, filter
Signaling Firewall
SMS Home Routing

Cooperate

Share experiences (GSMA)
IPSec with partners e.g. TW
Cooperation with legislators

Prepare

Follow FS.11,FS.19,FS.07
Find weak spots
Node hardening/procedures

CyberTrust WP4 Impacts – Academic Locally

- ✓ D4.4 A report, submitted publication, or thesis on escalation paths of targeted attacks, detection and mitigation approaches, technical viewpoint
- ✓ Academic impacts:
 - ✓ Two theses on DoS in mobile LTE networks / Location tracking in LTE
 - ✓ Workshop organization on 5G Security
 - ✓ Close academic – industry collaboration between F-Secure, VTT, Aalto, Abo University and Nokia
 - ✓ Blackhat / Troopers / IEEE ICC / NATO presentations (key ones)
 - ✓ Follow up request from operators and legislators -> Market creation with finnish leading expertise

CyberTrust WP4 Leaves a World Impacts

- ✓ Nokia impact:
 - ✓ Nokia Firewall product mitigation and detection enhancements
 - ✓ Nokia Security service enhancements (penetration testing)
 - ✓ Improvement of various products (hardening)

- ✓ Global and Industry impact
 - ✓ Finland recognized worldwide expertise on security (worldwide requests e.g. Taiwan regulator tomorrow)
 - ✓ GSMA standards (worldwide roaming security standards)
 - ✓ Attack scenarios, forensic analysis information, countermeasures input
 - ✓ Firewall configuration technical details
 - ✓ US FCC guideline 3/2017 given to congress, work continues in a new Working Group
 - ✓ US DHS guideline to be given to congress
 - ✓ Nordic regulators proactively work on diameter security
 - ✓ Worldwide security deployments and customers
 - ✓ SOME & News coverage



Contact us!

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